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The episodes of great financial volatility and wide fluctuations
in the level of activity of a number of economies have height-
ened the debate on how major macroeconomic fluctuations are
generated and spread. Although it is acknowledged that much
can be learned from the study of specific cases, in the litera-
ture decisions are often presented as though the agents adopt-
ing them were fully aware of all the relevant probability
distributions. It is desirable, however, that in analysing these
phenomena it should be recognized that both the economic
agents and policy-makers are acting in variable contexts, with
perceptions and expectations that change according to the in-
ferences that each one draws from the evolution of the sur-
rounding environment. In these conditions, the interpretation
of fundamental variables such as the fiscal deficit or the cur-
rent account balance is necessarily conditioned by conjectures
about their future evolution: it cannot be maintained, then, that
the state of the “fundamentals” is directly observable. The
changing perceptions of the agents can thus result in big fluc-
tuations in expenditure and credit conditions. This article ad-
dresses the problems of expectations which can give rise to
failures in the coordination of intertemporal plans and
consideres policies which could prevent or reduce such upsets;
analyses, with regard to fiscal matters, the evaluation by
the public sector of its budgetary constraints over time and
the possible application of counter-cyclical measures; reviews
the alternatives open in terms of the choice of exchange-rate
systems in economies with different characteristics (especially
the greater or lesser use of foreign currencies as denominators
in contracts) and the design of financial policies; briefly refers
to the international transmission of macroeconomic impulses,
and finally offers some conclusions.
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I
Introduction
The recent episodes of great financial volatility and
big swings in the level of activity which have been
observed in a number of economies have intensified
the debate on how major macroeconomic impulses
are generated and spread. These phenomena seem to
have a special nature, different from that of “small”
economic cycles: they cause concern because they
can give rise to considerable real costs and they may
be associated with discontinuities in the growth path.
From the point of view of policy formulation, the ex-
periences of recent years have made economists ask
themselves what instruments could serve to make
major fluctuations less likely and to improve the
“crisis management” measures that might be needed
to deal with them. This article seeks to make some
contribution to the analysis of these issues.
The analytical approaches taken to study macro-
economic fluctuations marked by credit crises have
changed over the course of time. At one time, such
fluctuations were considered to be inherent in the
evolution of the economic system. Later on, macro-
economic analysis tended to leave them aside, con-
sidering them as anomalies that were associated with
particular individual economies and were due to visi-
ble policy inconsistencies. Recent experience, how-
ever, suggests that although there is no reason why
such crises should recur systematically, they can af-
fect very different economies and regions and even
the international system as a whole.
The events of recent years have had various
novel aspects as regards the mechanisms behind the
generation of financial disturbances and the patterns
of propagation of impulses between economies, al-
though they have also had traditional elements
too.1 It is generally acknowledged that much re-
mains to be learned about these processes and that
it would be useful to explore the lessons that could
be drawn from the different experiences in this
field. The point of view taken in the present article
is that this attitude should be incorporated into the
analysis itself, because it has very concrete impli-
cations: it is important to bear in mind that the de-
cisions of the economic agents and policy-makers
are made in contexts where perceptions and expecta-
tions change according to the inferences that each
one draws from the evolution of the relevant envi-
ronment. In these conditions, it is hard to imagine
that, in establishing their plans, the actors have a
complete and finished model of the working of the
economy before them. Something similar occurs in
the case of an analyst studying macroeconomic dis-
turbances: in view of the type of phenomenon being
studied, the conclusions drawn and the possible rec-
ommendations made will necessarily be of a tenta-
tive nature.
In the following section (section II), some
comments are made on the relation between the
fundamental variables and expectations. This ques-
tion, about which a great deal has been written, is
of central importance for interpreting major fluctu-
ations in expenditure and in credit conditions. Sec-
tion III deals with economic policy issues
associated with the prevention and management of
major upsets, and finally section IV contains some
comments on the international transmission of
macroeconomic impulses.
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1 Thus, some analogies could be drawn with the “trade crises”
of the past, such as those analysed, for example, by Bagehot
(1858 and 1873). The existence of such analogies and of ques-
tions which have remained unanswered for a very long time
shows the complexity of the problems involved in the analysis
of such fluctuations. At the same time, the fact that there are ex-
amples of crises which have occurred in very different condi-
tions and times would seem to indicate that the fluctuations
probably have their origin in general aspects of credit supply
and demand decisions rather than in particular details of finan-
cial technology, although the latter would of course help to de-
termine the particular features of each episode.
II
Fundamental variables and expectations
A sharp distinction is usually drawn between
changes in the state of the economy due to move-
ments in the fundamental variables and changes aris-
ing from phenomena of coordination of expectations
–of the type of self-fulfilling prophecies– in situa-
tions with multiple equilibria. It is thus assumed in
advance that such variables are objectively definable
(subject only to the availability of sufficiently com-
plete and up-to-date information), and it is also as-
sumed that the expectations are always and
necessarily consistent with each other, even though
the resulting macroeconomic states are not always
the best ones compatible with the basic variables.
This distinction is not really as clear as it might
seem at first sight, however. When studying the evo-
lution of fiscal policy, for example, the deficit in a
given period does not provide sufficient information
to determine the sustainability of the government’s
financial management. It is therefore suggested that
indicators should be used which include corrections
as a function of the state of the economic cycle or the
variation in contingent public sector debts (see
ECLAC, 1998a). In order to make such corrections,
however, it is necessary to formulate some hypothe-
ses on discrimination between cycles and trends in
economic activity or on the size of undocumented
public sector commitments, for which purpose it is
also necessary to make some conjectures about the
future behaviour of the economy.2 This point is of a
general nature. For example, the interpretation of
balance of payments current account results depends
on how one assesses such aspects as the growth po-
tential of the economy, the return on the investments
being made, or the consistency of consumers’ expen-
diture and indebtedness decisions: in other words, in
order to make this interpretation it is necessary to
place current behaviour in the context of the ex-
pected evolution of the opportunities for generating
income (Heymann, 1994). Likewise, the valuation
of assets is naturally a function of the perceptions
regarding future movements of dividend flows.
Clearly, the fundamental variables do not relate
to data at a given moment but to time sequences
which must be projected one way or another. Of
course, if it is assumed that the processes generating
the relevant variables are known, then the projection
is automatically formulated on the basis of past ob-
servations. In these conditions, “there is nothing new
to learn”: all the relevant information has already
been incorporated in the model on which the expec-
tations are based, and it is known for sure that this
model will not be changed, because there are no new
inferences to be drawn from the data. The future path
of the system would thus be determined by “intrinsi-
cally” random disturbances which cannot be repre-
sented except in terms of their probability
distribution, which is known.3
These hypotheses may be a useful approach for
a variety of purposes, and it is possible of course
that, when dealing with long periods, the past trajec-
tory of an economy can serve for the extrapolation,
without too much error, of regularities which have
already been incorporated in the schemes of forma-
tion of expectations. The validity of such hypotheses
is by no means as clear, however, for studying events
such as crises, when it is observed that not only are
the plans of the agents upset, but also the prior inter-
pretations of the events seem to be generally ques-
tioned and there is a feverish search for the “lessons
of experience”. In other words, these fluctuations
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2 With regard to the trend-cycle breakdown, it should be borne
in mind that the usual filters determine the trend at a particular
point in time, using data subsequent to that moment. A recursive
estimate, using only information observed up to the current pe-
riod, may be appreciably different from the “definitive” calcula-
tion. This suggests that –for example, when assessing whether
a particular form of behaviour has been pro-cyclical or
counter-cyclical– a distinction should be made between a retro-
spective judgement and one based on the knowledge available
when the decisions were taken.
3 It might be useful here to note the distinction, from the point
of view of the formation of expectations, between exogenous
impulses and those of international origin. The former refer to
variables whose evolution is left out of the analysis in the model
defining the predictions; the latter include variables due to the
actions of agents who do not reside within the economy but, in
principle, can nevertheless be represented in order to project the
behaviour of the economic environment, just as an individual
agent would try to find ways of anticipating the behaviour of
other agents with whom he interacts.
seem to correspond to cases of transition in econo-
mies whose configuration is changing and in which
past patterns of behaviour do not seem to form a
sound basis for making predictions.4
In situations like these, identification of the fun-
damental variables ceases to be accurate, both for
analysts and for decision-makers. It is not just a
question of the greater or lesser availability of data:
the lack of accuracy is due to the fact that there is no
clearly defined manner of processing the information
which will ensure the optimal nature of the expecta-
tions generated. In particular, in some cases it is es-
pecially difficult to project output and income trends:
the changes which take place in the corresponding
perceptions as individuals go through their learning
processes5 can lead to cycles in estimates of wealth
and expenditure capacity and in the valuation of
assets (Heymann and Sanguinetti, 1998a and b).
When there are no firm bases for projecting fu-
ture opportunities, decisions and interpretations of
observed behaviour are necessarily of a speculative
nature, not only because the plans made at a given
moment are contingent upon uncertain future events,
but also because, for each agent, those plans repre-
sent a wager on a particular way of forming expecta-
tions, and furthermore their outcome depends on
how other individuals make their forecasts and revise
them over time. This is also true of economic policy
measures, regardless of the scope of their objectives:
in particular, all policies which aim to take account
of the government’s capacity to generate income
over time and the credit conditions it will be facing
must also take into account the future evolution of
the state of the economy and the perceptions of the
various groups of agents. The complexity of public
and private decisions is not always obvious, but it
becomes very clear at times of crisis.
It may be gathered from the foregoing argu-
ments that, if we accept that there is no sure and uni-
versally applicable model for the formation of
expectations, then changes in the perceptions about
the fundamental variables will play a potentially im-
portant role in certain fluctuating circumstances, and
such perceptions are a matter of individual opinion.6
The formation of expectations will be particularly
difficult in periods of transition, when, for example,
there are signs of possible speeding-up of income
trends which can give rise to upward revisions of in-
vestment and consumption opportunities, or when
there are fears of an abrupt downward shift. Errors of
expectations which have macroeconomic effects will
be more frequent in such periods. At the same time,
insofar as agents perceive the fragility of their pre-
diction schemes, there will be “flexibility prefer-
ence” effects: individuals will be reluctant to take
positions perceived as being hard to reverse (Hicks,
1974; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994); also, imitative
forms of conduct associated with possible “herd
behaviour” will begin to assume importance (see
Banerjee, 1992).
Reviews of expectations about fundamental
variables can thus become a source of macroeco-
nomic fluctuations. A substantial proportion of re-
cent analyses have noted another possibility: that of
“self-fulfilling prophecies” in systems that allow of a
number of equilibrium paths, whereby the economy
can be led to collectively undesirable states, because
of the conduct of the other agents, even if each agent
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4 This is a traditional problem: as Walter Bagehot pointed out
many years ago, “in many cases crises cannot be attributed be-
yond reasonable doubt to causes which are known to be real, so
that although the problem is clearly visible it is not possible to
explain its causes with concrete facts and figures. The circum-
stances of trade crises differ so much that it is not easy to find a
mechanism that can be applied to all of them” (Bagehot, 1858).
Some recent studies have acknowledged that, in macroeco-
nomic analysis, it should be borne in mind that data-generating
processes can change in an unpredictable manner: as Calvo
(1998) points out; “statisticians have the instruments needed to
give us an estimate of how shocks are broken down as between
permanent and transitory phenomena, but in order to do this it is
necessary to make some very strong assumptions, in particular
that the present does not differ significantly from the past. How-
ever, this assumption is questionable with regard to emerging
markets”. Moreover, in recent times greater attention has been
paid to the statistical properties of series such as those on the re-
turns on assets, which seem to display appreciable discrepan-
cies with the normal distributions, so that a larger proportion of
probabilities are at “extreme” values (see, for example, Lo,
1997).
5 There has been a good deal of discussion in the recent litera-
ture about models designed to represent learning processes in
economic contexts. See, for example, Sargent (1993), Kirman
and Salmon (1995) and Evans and Honkapohja (1998).
6 From this standpoint, when we refer for example to the “fun-
damental valuation” of given assets we should perhaps add
(even if only implicitly) the awkward phrase “according to the
analytical model of the agent making the valuation”. This point
is of practical relevance. Thus, for example, the concern ex-
pressed by the Federal Reserve Board of the United States about
share prices (see for example Greenspan, 1997) was connected
with doubts about the way assets were valued and, indirectly,
doubts about the validity of the growth projections for enter-
prise earnings underlying the demand for securities.
acts optimally.7 Although there can undeniably be
interaction among individual expectations, one may
wonder about the validity of arguments that attribute
crises simply to a (socially) “bad” equilibrium se-
lection. In models on self-fulfilling prophecies, the
result is sub-optimal but the individual decisions
are fully compatible with each other: all the agents
know the path that the system will follow, and act
accordingly. There is therefore no doubt about how
the economy operates, which contrasts with the
marked uncertainty that seems to prevail in such epi-
sodes. Quite apart from the foregoing, however,
there are queries about how expectations are fo-
cussed on a given path and about the options open to
economic policy for dealing with situations of
self-generated runs, if these are the only disturbing
element.
It might be useful to consider a specific case,
such as for example a situation where the govern-
ment has a mass of short-term debt which it has been
refinancing. In order to focus on the logic of the ar-
gument, let us assume that in the hypothetical econ-
omy in question it is common knowledge (i.e., there
are well-founded and unanimous expectations, also
unanimously seen as such) that the government can
service the debt, and has incentives to do so, if it
continues to be refinanced. In other words, there are
no “fundamental problems” that affect the govern-
ment’s financial position. There will thus be a good
equilibrium in which each asset-holder, anticipating
that all the others will be willing to keep on lending,
will consider that the best policy for him is to do the
same and buy bonds once again when they mature.
Consequently, there are no disturbances and no in-
ducement for policy changes. If the level of indebt-
edness is sufficiently high, however, there may also
be another type of equilibrium in which the collec-
tive expectation is that the creditors will refuse to re-
finance the debt;8 if there is a stampede the
government will not be able to generate the resources
to rescue the debt, so that its obligations will be paid
off at a discount (either explicitly, or through a rise
in prices, if the debt is in local currency), thus con-
firming the initial pessimistic forecasts. In this case,
there is a self-fulfilling prophecy of a policy turn-
around which is entirely the result of the formation
of expectations, since such a turnaround would not
occur in the case of the other possible equilibrium.
Obviously, the costs assumed by the agents in
the bad equilibrium could potentially be avoided:
what is needed is to coordinate decisions properly. In
the foregoing example, the government does in prin-
ciple have the means to do this. If, in the event of
signs of a stampede, it decides to pay off the matur-
ing bonds with other securities offering similar
yields, then everything would take place (according
to the hypotheses of this exercise) as if the govern-
ment had persuaded asset-holders to “select the right
equilibrium”, thus bringing the system to an opti-
mum state. In this situation, there is no need for a fis-
cal adjustment, or discounting of the debt, or upward
leaps in price levels, because there is no fundamental
reason calling for this. At the same time, from the
standpoint of the private agents, although the refi-
nancing of the debt would force each of them to
carry out an action which would be different from
that which they would have chosen in the stampede
equilibrium, it would not cause losses:9 on the con-
trary, according to the assumptions of the example,
this measure would lead to a state which was prefer-
able for all the individuals in question (or at least no
worse) compared with the situation that would exist
if such a measure were not taken. In the hypothetical
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7 With regard to matters such as the generation of bank runs and
the refinancing of the public debt, see for example Calvo, 1988,
and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), for their part, present a bank run model and analyse pol-
icy issues connected with those mentioned in the following
paragraph of this article.
8 Determining the probability to be assigned to the different
possible states is a delicate matter in arguments on multiple
equilibria. Here, in order to simplify the argument, it is assumed
that the possibility of a panic was not incorporated in the
predictions, although this is close to being a contradiction if
it is desired to represent the expectations of the agents as
rational. At all events, the respective probabilities perceived
by individuals could depend in turn on the predictions regarding
the economic policy responses in terms of the coordination
of expectations (see the analysis of this matter later on in this
article).
9 This conclusion is a consequence of the hypotheses of the ex-
ample, which ignore the possibility that some agents might as-
sign great importance to the fact of having immediate
availability of their funds (for example, if they had planned to
concentrate their expenditure on the moment of maturity of the
assets and they had no other possibilities of gaining access to
liquid resources). At all events, the argument is not substan-
tially modified by the incorporation of this effect if it can be as-
sumed that the number of agents in this situation is known
approximately, even though there is no information allowing
them to be individually identified (see Diamond and Dybvig,
1983).
case of the exercise, there would therefore be no rea-
son why the refinancing should cause loss of prestige
by the government.
The foregoing analysis seems to suggest that if a
crisis occurs as the result of self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, this could be because the government does not
act (although capable of doing so) in a manner which
serves to coordinate the agents’ plans in the direction
of a better state in which the predictions are also ful-
filled. If the idea that crises can be prevented rela-
tively easily seems at first sight rather implausible,
this is not due to a flaw in the argument as such
but to the hypotheses on which it is based, especially
the assumption that the attack on certain assets could
take place even in the absence of any uncertainty
over the fundamental values determining the debtors’
creditworthiness. In practice, expectation coordina-
tion phenomena often seem to take on importance
precisely when there are doubts over repayment ca-
pacity (for example, it is hard to imagine a run on de-
posits if there are no indications of problems in the
banks’ portfolios). This does not mean, of course,
that the assessments of repayment capacity are nec-
essarily homogeneous and correct. On the other
hand, “liquidity crises” can have powerful real ef-
fects by forcing the liquidation of assets and a con-
traction in credit (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997),
which has repercussions in turn on the wealth of the
agents and hence their creditworthiness.
Various types of financial crises which have re-
percussions on real activity may be distinguished
(see Calvo, 1995, and Leijonhufvud, 1998). In the
case of the phenomena of interest to us (associated
with events such as the Latin American crises of the
early 1980s or the more recent macroeconomic up-
sets in Asia and Latin America), there have been big
changes in perceptions of the creditworthiness of the
public sector or major segments of the private sector,
as well as sharp oscillations in the supply of credit
and the capacity to finance the demand for goods. A
feature shared by various cases is that they displayed
big movements in the estimations of wealth, re-
flected in expenditure decisions and the valuation of
assets. It is also clear that fluctuations are amplified
and spread through variations in the severity of li-
quidity constraints. In other words, in these cases the
effects originating in changes in the forecasts about
the fundamental variables, in contagion of expecta-
tions and in fluctuations in liquidity conditions min-
gle in such a way that they confront private agents
and policy makers with complex challenges as re-
gards the identification of signals and the taking of
decisions. The following section focuses on matters




In the view of the foregoing analysis, credit crises
can be associated with downward revisions of the
wealth perceptions of macroeconomically significant
agents, the effects of which spread through second-
ary impacts on income and wealth and the tightening
of liquidity constraints. In these episodes, many
agents must suffer losses and reduce expenditure in
order to adapt to their intertemporal budgetary re-
strictions. It is possible, however, that there may be
over-adjustments due to the excessive volatility of
expectations and illiquidity effects. In cases of major
disturbances, amplification mechanisms probably en-
ter into action which multiply the cost of the original
disturbance. From the standpoint of policy manage-
ment, it is important that the necessary adjustments
should be made, but it is also important that unneces-
sary contractions should be avoided. Crises are peri-
ods of great uncertainty in which it is by no means a
simple matter to determine the sustainable levels of
income and expenditure of economic units and
groups of agents. In these conditions, policy deci-
sions can hardly be approached on the basis of me-
chanical criteria, without taking into account the
state of the economy and the public sector’s capacity
for action. These difficulties highlight the value of
safeguard measures.
The management of economic policy over time
raises various queries about the incentives that guide
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decisions at given moments and the way in which
policy design incorporates the possibility that “unex-
pected” circumstances may arise and determines the
action that should be taken when this happens. The
comments made in this section will deal primarily
with the latter type of questions. It is clear from the
start that any idea of defining strategies that are opti-
mal for any set of contingencies is not realistic. This
would be tantamount to trying to programme generic
actions in advance, which would call for unattainable
levels of knowledge on the operation of the system
and the shocks that could occur over time. Conse-
quently, if we acknowledge the difficulty of identify-
ing rigorously fixed criteria which do not admit any
exceptions,10 what we must do is to seek approaches
that take account of the learning process effected in
analytical work and the observation of concrete ex-
perience. Furthermore, the problem of the prevention
and management of major disturbances has special
features, since it concerns phenomena whose proba-
bility and specific details cannot be accurately
known in advance, because they are relatively infre-
quent and are usually associated with more or less
rapid changes in the configuration of the economies
in question. This particularly affects the assessment
of the costs and benefits of preventive measures:
quite apart from the “subjective” nature of the atti-
tudes towards risks it is difficult to define with nu-
merical precision probability distributions of events
of different types and intensities that could serve as
the basis for more precise calculations. At all events,
in recent times we have seen that there is a by no
means negligible potential for macroeconomic insta-
bility, and economic policies should naturally be for-
mulated in the light of this fact.
1. Fiscal policy
It is a well known fact that disorder in the public fi-
nances involves heavy economic costs. When the
public sector is unable to handle the demands for ex-
penditure within the constraints imposed by its ca-
pacity to generate resources, it lacks the means to
define systematic policies. High and changing rates
of inflation, possibly interrupted by occasional but
transitory attempts at stabilization, are a typical
symptom of such situations. Quite apart from the dis-
tortions that the inflation tax generates in itself, in-
consistency in fiscal matters generates instability in
policies too, since the government is forced to act as
a function of the pressures of the moment. The re-
sulting volatility complicates decisions and narrows
the agents’ horizon for planning ahead. The conse-
quences are clearly visible in economic performance,
especially in the credit markets, because the parties
to a possible contract cannot predict their future situ-
ation except in the short term. This further heightens
the liquidity constraints, not only for the government
but also for broad groups of private agents. In order
to overcome these situations, it is essential to take
measures to restore the creditworthiness of the public
sector.
As already noted, creditworthiness is a prospec-
tive notion. At all events, experience suggests that
perceptions of the soundness of the government fi-
nances over time gradually change as a function of
its observed behaviour: a history of instability can af-
fect the public sector’s access to credit for a long
time. Especially in the case of economies which are
facing a change in their fiscal system, there will
probably be some tension between the incentive to
give signals of financial soundness and the search for
areas of action that can help soften macroeconomic
impacts.
In analysing fiscal policy as a macroeconomic
instrument, it is impossible to leave out the situation
of the public sector and the state of the economy. It
may be said that the considerable changes that have
taken place in views on the role of such policy are
partly due to the fact that the typical cases to which
the analyses refer have been changing. In studies
written after the 1930s depression, emphasis was
placed on the counter-cyclical effect that such policy
could have on aggregate demand and the desirability
of easing fiscal policy in recessions. The argument
was that the creditworthiness of the public sector was
not in question (so that the government would have
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10 Once again, this is a traditional issue in macroeconomic dis-
cussions. Thus, when commenting on proposals to add an “elas-
tic clause” to the monetary system of his time (that is to say, an
“escape clause” that would add a pre-specified contingent ele-
ment to the prevailing rules), Bagehot (1858) takes the view
that “the essential principle is that at a certain point in trade cri-
ses the directors of the bank and/or the government should be
empowered to authorize an additional issue of banknotes, suit-
ably backed by securities”. He considers that the need for such a
faculty can hardly be questioned, although there are many great
difficulties in determining exactly how it should be granted. In
contrast, he considered that the “elastic clause” seemed a more
artificial expedient, concluding that the whole matter was a
question of "choosing between different types of difficulties".
no difficulty in financing possible deficits, which the
public would see as transitory phenomena) and there
were situations of insufficient effective demand in
which it was difficult for the private sector to coordi-
nate a level of expansion which would lead to “nor-
mal” use of the available resources. Now, however,
many proposals take a markedly different attitude:
that there is no reason why fiscal policy should seek
to affect the level of activity and that, in any case,
the best contribution it could make in this sense is to
avoid a situation where public indebtedness exerts
pressure on the credit markets: in the event of an ad-
verse shock priority should be given to adjusting pol-
icies to maintain a low public deficit.
In view of these clear discrepancies, it might be
useful to imagine two extreme situations resulting
from a shock which reduces activity. In the first, pos-
sible suppliers of credit perceive the government as
being in a fragile creditworthiness position. In this
scenario, it is assumed that these perceptions are
highly influenced by the short-term evolution of fis-
cal policy, either because it is expected that the dis-
turbance will have lasting effects on public sector
income or because creditors appraise the fiscal atti-
tude of the government as a function of its immedi-
ate behaviour. Any attempt to issue new debt would
hence raise growing doubts about repayment possi-
bilities. Not only would the harder credit conditions
affect the public sector but the uncertainty over fiscal
policy would also affect the private sector’s capacity
to finance expenditure. In any event, the budgetary
constraints on the government would be such as to
make fiscal adjustment the only option (which does
not mean that it would not also be costly), unless the
government resorted to the even more costly expedi-
ent of inflation. In the second situation, aggregate ex-
penditure is reduced for some reason and doubts
arise about the solvency of a significant part of the
private sector; the recession spreads through the
hardening of credit conditions and the fall in employ-
ment. If the government is seen as being credit-
worthy, the “flight to quality” in the demand for
assets may possibly increase the propensity of indi-
viduals who have funds to hold public securities. In
these circumstances, a large number of agents will be
facing serious liquidity constraints and, at the same
time, the government can take out debt at a low cost.
Thus, expansionary fiscal policy operations would be
possible which, by increasing the resources available
to the agents suffering from a shortage of liquidity,
would help to secure a recovery in aggregate demand
and thus improve the opportunities of individuals as
a whole11 (Leijonhufvud, 1973).
This argument is applicable to cases of pro-
nounced contraction, and differs from the traditional
analyses as regards the management of fiscal policy
over time on the basis of “representative agent” con-
structs (Lucas, 1986). There are also some general
points of contact, however: a form of fiscal manage-
ment which seeks to improve the possibilities for
agents managing production and consumption over
time should be based on an appraisal of the type and
persistence of the shocks observed. This means ex-
amining projections of the future conditions of the
economy. There is also a certain similarity between
the two cases referred to in the previous paragraph.
In the first case, the liquidity problems primarily af-
fect the public sector; in the second, they affect a
large group of private agents: what is needed is to
channel resources from the less constrained sector to
the more constrained sector, through an adjustment
which reduces the deficit, or through measures which
increase the spending capacity of the illiquid units,
as appropriate. One thing is clear: in order for the
government to be able to embark on this latter type
of fiscal operations designed to soften the impact of
the disturbances on the private sector, it must have a
sound level of creditworthiness.
In practice, the government’s scope for action
depends on the state of the economy. Major distur-
bances in aggregate expenditure and the level of pro-
duction not only affect the capacity to collect taxes
but can also abruptly increase the public debt, explic-
itly or not (rescue operations for the financial system
are a typical example of this). This means that, even
from the restricted standpoint of looking after the
public finances, it is important to limit the size of re-
cessions. On the other hand, however, it is possible
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11 It is well known that when there are liquidity constraints, the
Ricardian equivalence proposition does not hold; that is, these
operations would be effective even when there is a clear percep-
tion that the increased public debt will generate a rise in future
taxes. It should be noted that in a situation like that described
here there are big differences between the implicit discount
rates of different individuals: one group possesses liquid re-
sources and is willing to lend at a low rate if there is no risk, but
finds it difficult to identify creditworthy potential debtors, while
the other group has a strong preference for current expenditure,
since its opportunities are limited by current income, which is
comparatively low. Thus, the action of fiscal policy may be
equated with that of establishing a financial intermediation
channel between the two groups.
that situations may arise where strong restrictions on
private sector activity may be combined with diffi-
cult access to credit on the part of the government, if
the latter is unable to make it clear that it can make
up for present deficits with greater generation of
funds in the future. Such cases raise particularly
complex problems of fiscal policy decision-making
because of the combination of opposing demands:
complying with the budgetary constraints and pre-
serving what is left of public credit, avoiding an
over-adjustment in the provision of services, soften-
ing the impact on private expenditure and probably
also taking care of distributive tensions, which may
increase.
The possibility that conditions of this type may
arise highlights the importance of preventive mea-
sures. There is general consensus on the desirability
of practising counter-cyclical fiscal management.
Maintaining a certain amount of leeway in the public
finances when the economy is operating normally is
particularly useful when the possibility that the pri-
vate sector could be a source of instability is not
completely ruled out. Such leeway can take various
specific forms, such as the accumulation of liquid
funds (or the implementation of contingent financing
mechanisms which make it easier to gain access to
funds when needed), but at all events it would appear
to require a degree of “taxation capacity” previously
unused in periods of expansion which could serve as
backing for credit if some event which has an impact
on the economy occurs. As is usually the case with
insurance mechanisms, preventive policies are not
without their costs, but the dangers involved in fiscal
fragility have been amply demonstrated. At the same
time, however, the idea that fiscal management
should include elements to protect against the possi-
bility of negative shocks still leaves open the ques-
tion of how to identify trends in the evolution of the
economy: one form of caution in this respect could
be to avoid over-hasty extrapolation into the future
of signs of strong growth12 and to take action if it is
seen that the private sector is taking decisions on the
basis of exaggerated projections.
2. Financial policies and exchange rate regimes
The debate on financial policies leaves little room for
simplistic positions. It is difficult to give general va-
lidity either to the arguments that the public sector
can and should control the assets markets in detail or
to those that assume that, in the absence of distorting
interventions, those markets have self-regulating
properties which automatically guarantee their
proper overall functioning. Obviously, credit condi-
tions sometimes show great instability, and in such
cases economic policy should take action in one way
or another: there are a number of examples of
large-scale interventions (with heavy fiscal costs)
which contradicted previous announcements that the
government would not interfere (Vaz, 1999). At the
same time, however, identifying mechanisms that
will ease the smooth evolution of financial transac-
tions and reduce instability is no simple matter, not
only because of the analytical complexity of the
problem but also because the configuration of finan-
cial systems changes, as well as differing from one
country to another. The range of contracts (as re-
gards the variety of assets, terms and denominations)
and the forms of intermediation seem to depend on
the past history of the economy. Although it is useful
to seek criteria that can be applied more or less gen-
erally, these specific features need to be taken into
account.
These special characteristics become clear when
one considers the links between the credit markets
and the exchange rate regime. At one extreme, there
are the cases where a large part of the assets issued
by residents of a country are in the hands of other
residents and the instruments are mostly denomi-
nated in local currency; when the agents display a
demand for liquidity they are likewise showing a
propensity to increase their local currency holdings.
This means, on the one hand, that if there are mas-
sive withdrawals of funds from the financial system
and the public sector is called upon to act as lender
of last resort, a currency issue will not always imme-
diately lead to pressures on the foreign exchange
market if the increase in the money supply is
matched by greater demand. Likewise, movements in
the external parity of the currency need not necessar-
ily have a substantial effect on the willingness to of-
fer credit, because asset-holders consider above all
the purchasing power of their positions in terms of
domestic goods: as long as domestic inflation does
not change too much, fluctuations in the exchange
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12 In this respect, mention may be made of Talvi’s argument
(Talvi, 1996) on the interpretation of the fiscal results in the
case of the demand booms which usually accompany some sta-
bilization programmes: the problem here is confusion of a sud-
den transitory rise in revenue with a permanent one, the
difficulty being that it is not easy to distinguish between the two
kinds of shocks in transitional periods.
rate do not have much effect on individuals’ percep-
tions of their wealth or expectations regarding debt
service capacity, although they do change relative
prices and the incentives for different types of activity.
At the other extreme, there is the case of a
highly dollarized economy, where the liquidity re-
serves consist mainly of foreign exchange and finan-
cial contracts are mostly denominated in foreign
currency. Here, in particular, a fall in the willingness
to keep funds in the banks when there are doubts
about the soundness of those entities is quickly re-
flected in greater demand for external assets and the
government is thus induced to provide those assets in
one form or another if it wishes to avoid a situation
where the financial system ceases to fulfill its foreign
currency commitments (when the effects of the
shock on the exchange rate are so serious that the
withdrawals of foreign currency deposits cannot be
made good with the corresponding liquid assets of
the intermediaries), preventing the shift of the local
currency deposit portfolio to liquid foreign ex-
change. In an economy of this type, an exchange rate
devaluation automatically leads to a revaluation of li-
abilities and operates as a debt deflation mechanism
of the type described by Fisher (1933): it thus has
wealth effects and can in itself bring on a contraction
in credit, by bringing into question the solvency of
borrowers (and probably also by rendering more un-
certain the real value of payments for contracts using
the denominator previously applied by convention).
Thus, in these circumstances it is very likely that a
devaluation will help to spark off or heighten a re-
cession. The dollarization of credit acts as a strong
disincentive against allowing major movements in
the exchange rate.
There is of course a wide range of intermediate
cases between the two extremes in question.13 How-
ever, it may be noted that attitudes to variations in
the exchange rate differ according to the economy in
question: in some cases governments go to great
lengths to limit the size of exchange rate swings,
whereas in others they give priority to other criteria.
At this point, it is worth considering why exchange
rate flexibility can be useful. Limited fluctuation of
the exchange rate can introduce a certain amount of
friction into capital movements and give monetary
policy some degree of autonomy; at the same time,
the price of foreign exchange acts as an adjustment
mechanism for relatively small disturbances. The
main question, however, is what the response to very
strong disturbances should be: i.e., if it is acceptable
to allow the exchange rate to register a correspond-
ingly large variation. When this is not so (either be-
cause of the characteristics of the financial system or
because it is considered that exchange rate stability
and price stability are closely associated),14 it seems
reasonable that the exchange rate regime should try
to reduce uncertainty about the possibility of a major
devaluation; keeping the option open would then
mean paying a certain price (especially in terms of
high interest rates, with the corresponding problems
for public and private debtors) in order to maintain a
degree of flexibility that there would be little inclina-
tion to use when the time came. On the other hand, if
the reaction of the market to exchange rate uncer-
tainty is to make wider use of foreign currency in
contracts, then this –as already noted– tends to make
it more difficult to use the exchange rate as a means
of adjustment. It is also clear, however, that rigidity
entails its own costs, which become particularly evi-
dent when there are disturbances of external origin.
The dilemmas that arise in choosing exchange rate
systems emphasize the fact that there is no simple re-
gime which is definitely preferable to the other alter-
natives, whatever the characteristics of the economy.
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13 This variety concerns not only the relative proportions of fi-
nancial contracts denominated in local or foreign currency but
also the use of schemes such as price indexing, which is often
applied in some countries (and is usually associated with a his-
tory of inflation which is persistent but does not reach extreme
levels). From the point of view of our analysis, indexed con-
tracts are quite a different matter from those denominated in for-
eign currency, since the real value of the payments does not
depend directly on variations in the exchange rate. Indeed, a
sudden rise in the exchange rate would tend to reduce the real
value of indexed debts (in so far as it is associated with a rise in
domestic inflation, and bearing in mind that the price indexes
currently applied have lags), whereas it would increase the real
value of commitments expressed in foreign currency (if domes-
tic prices vary less than proportionately).
14 The analysis made here has laid stress on the disturbances in
the system of financial contracts that can be caused by big varia-
tions in the exchange rate in economies where many debts are
expressed in foreign currency. Past experience (including that of
recent episodes) suggests that abrupt devaluations are generally
associated with considerable rises in the real exchange rate: this
means that there is not an equally sharp response by domestic
prices. Even so, in some cases the exchange rate is the main
nominal anchor; this feature can also be linked with the ways
contracts are denominated.
The dollarization of financial assets can of
course be induced by economic policy measures, but
it can also occur more or less spontaneously. Within
the limits of the influence of economic policy, there
may be options which are by no means unimportant:
the spread of the use of foreign currency as a unit of
account in financial operations restricts monetary
management in a manner which it may be difficult to
reverse, but in some conditions it seems to be almost
essential in order to endow the credit markets with a
certain density, especially in the case of transactions
which are not of a very short-term nature. These con-
ditions may also be associated with attitudes on the
part of the public which require that capital move-
ments with the exterior should be smooth and easy if
assets are to be kept in the country.
It is quite natural that the variability of interna-
tional flows of funds should have given rise to dis-
cussions about the treatment that should be given to
different forms of movement of resources (Agosin
and Ffrench-Davis, 1997; UNCTAD, 1998). It is worth
bearing in mind, in this respect, that (except in con-
ditions of strict rationing) the volume of external fi-
nance is not an externally given quantity but is
determined in conjunction with the decisions on
production and expenditure, and therefore depends
on the expectations and behaviour of the agents in
the economy itself. Nevertheless, great fluctuations
have been observed in the supply of credit from the
central countries to the rest of the world, and these
oscillations have had similar effects in very different
economies. Changes in the opportunities for access
to international credit have undoubtedly become
macroeconomic impulses of prime importance –just
as important as variations in the terms of interna-
tional trade, if not more so–15 and in a variety of
cases they have given rise to abrupt changes in the
rates of real expenditure and production. Such insta-
bility causes problems. What is less clear is how far
it is possible to reduce the transmission of externally
made valuations to the yields on domestic assets: in
economies which are already integrated into the in-
ternational capital market it would seem difficult to
generate frictions that could avoid cases of arbitrage
outside very limited ranges and thus prevent major
shifts in international interest rates or the risk percep-
tions of external operators from being reflected in lo-
cal markets.
Capital movements take the form of changes of
ownership of different types of assets. A widespread
source of concern is the possibility that there may be
rapid reversals of short-term capital flows which
force a sudden contraction in expenditure if creditors
demand that their loans be paid off. The concentra-
tion of finance in short-term instruments is undoubt-
edly an element of fragility, since there are generally
no matching resources rapidly available for servicing
debts. Apart from the normal activity of changing
maturities carried out by the financial system, it is
only reasonable that public or private agents should
try to avoid major discrepancies between the
time-patterns of their income and obligations. Here
too, however, dilemmas can arise. At times of uncer-
tainty, suppliers of credit will probably show a pref-
erence for flexibility, and this will lead to big
differences in yields, depending on the length of the
loan. In these circumstances, a rise in long-term in-
terest rates is in itself an impulse favouring a con-
traction in aggregate demand. At the same time, the
fact that debtors prefer to obtain longer-term loans
does not give any indication of what spread they
would be willing to pay.16 At the limit, if the cost of
long-term indebtedness becomes prohibitive, the
stark choice may be between accepting shorter matu-
rities on liabilities or reducing expenditure immedi-
ately. The first of these choices means wagering that
credit conditions will ease in the future if the reign-
ing uncertainty is dispelled, which may or may not
occur; at all events, the fragility produced by a con-
centration of short-term debt is probably the effect of
some problem (reversible or not, depending on the
circumstances) of perceptions of creditworthiness. In
many cases, strategies based on the idea of gaining
time may end up in a collapse (due to the refusal of
creditors to keep on refinancing the debt), but this
depends on the specific circumstances, so that it is
difficult to formulate a general proposition.
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15 On the other hand, these two types of impacts can well be
linked: the effects of a fall in export prices can be amplified by a
contraction in the supply of finance.
16 At this point, the indeterminate nature of the probabilities of
different situations becomes important if there are multiple
equilibria, because if these probabilities are not known it is not
possible to define accurately the value, for the recipient of a
loan, of “insurance” against the possibility that his creditors
will decide not to refinance the loan and will demand the return
of their funds.
Similar dilemmas may appear in other areas, es-
pecially in the interaction between financial and ex-
change rate policies. It is not unusual for episodes in
which there is a break with a fixed exchange rate re-
gime to be associated with bank crises (Kaminsky
and Reinhart, 1996). There is clearly a relation be-
tween the two phenomena: when banks begin to have
liquidity problems, there will probably be a conflict
between the need to act as a lender of last resort and
the maintenance of enough international reserves to
back up the exchange rate. It is hard to imagine the
central bank (or the public sector as a whole) remain-
ing on the sidelines if there is uncertainty about the
repayment of deposits in the banking system.17 But
an expansion in the money supply to help the banks
involves the risk of increasing the demand for for-
eign exchange, and raising interest rates in order to
maintain the level of the reserves may aggravate the
situation of debtors. Here too, policy management in
the face of these dilemmas (which also involve fiscal
management) seems to call both for a judgement on
the nature of the shock and for various types of con-
jectures: how far has loss of confidence spread
through the system as a whole?, is there an irrevers-
ible deterioration in portfolio quality, and is this lim-
ited to only a few firms or not?, how much access do
the banks have to foreign funds?, what prospects
does the government have of obtaining external re-
sources?, how will the demand for money respond to
an increase in official credit to the banks? and so
forth. In order to size up the situation in these condi-
tions it is necessary to collect and process informa-
tion, but above all to formulate a general view on the
basis of the available indicators, although the time
available for deciding on actions is very limited (and
the planning horizon of the private agents is short-
ened too): by their very nature, crises raise very com-
plex decision-making problems.
A first element for reducing the probability of
acute crises is to recognize that, although their fre-
quency and intensity cannot be determined precisely,
major disturbances in the assets markets do occur
from time to time, and economies are particularly
likely to suffer them if they are very sensitive to in-
ternational conditions or are undergoing changes in
their configuration which can give rise to potentially
volatile expectations. This recognition will naturally
lead to more or less continuous activity in the detec-
tion of signs of problems.18 This point applies in par-
ticular to the banking system. There is no need to
stress the importance of supervision and of the appli-
cation of prudential regulations on capital inflows, li-
quidity and the way to treat credit risks, which
reduce the system’s exposure to aggregate impulses
and forestall faulty management of the institutions in
question and the generation of serious moral hazard
problems (Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod, 1996; De
Juan, 1996). Experience shows that shortcomings of
supervision appreciably increase the fragility of the
banking system (and, ultimately, can give rise to
heavy contingent debts for the government) and,
conversely, that the strengthening of prudential con-
trol mechanisms puts the economy in a better posi-
tion to absorb shocks.
Likewise, if the government incorporates in its
decisions the possibility that it may, in certain emer-
gency situations, be obliged to provide liquidity as-
sistance to the financial sector or to face situations of
volatile demand for money, as well as recognizing
that exchange rate instability can entail high costs, it
will be advisable for it to maintain a relatively high
volume of readily available reserves (as a proportion,
for example, of bank liabilities not covered by their
own liquid foreign exchange holdings). Obviously,
in order to build up these funds in conditions of price
stability it will be necessary to generate present or
future fiscal surpluses (or at least not use the re-
sources from seigniorage for expenditure if the de-
mand for money increases) and to freeze assets that
could be used for other purposes. At the same time,
the availability of resources for use in emergencies
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17 And an announcement by the authorities that they will refrain
from taking action may have only a very limited effect on ex-
change rate credibility, because the collapse of the banks will
very likely have repercussions on the public finances, either di-
rectly, if the government finally covers the losses incurred once
the problem has worsened, or indirectly, through a fall in aggre-
gate activity: it is an example of “unpleasant arithmetic”
(Sargent and Wallace, 1981), involving a temporarily contrac-
tive monetary policy to deal with a probable deterioration of the
fiscal position.
18 Apart from the importance of looking for signs that will give
early warning of disturbances, it will probably be difficult to
identify reliable advance indicators in general terms, precisely
because the problem is to predict sharp reversals of expecta-
tions, and this does not appear to permit the use of purely me-
chanical procedures.
provides a means of giving greater credibility to the
financial and exchange system and provides some
flexibility of action for softening the impact of fluc-
tuations in the asset markets: accumulating funds
does involve costs, but on the other hand the exis-
tence of such funds allows policy measures to mod-
erate interest rate rises when there is a contraction of
credit and at the same time reduces the risk that the
exchange rate may be destabilized.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that it would be
possible to define regulations which, without impos-
ing excessively strict limits on intermediation opera-
tions (and hence without excessively restricting
credit to those units which rely on the banks for their
finance, typically small enterprises), at the same time
reduce the likelihood of systemic problems in the
banks to the minimum. This means that there will not
be “full-coverage insurance”. Furthermore, experi-
ence shows that volatility of securities values can
also give rise to considerable fluctuations in credit
conditions. Likewise, regardless of whether the pub-
lic sector has built up reserves as a preventive mea-
sure or not, it is possible that the economy may be
faced with such serious conditions of illiquidity that
its capacity for policy intervention on the basis of the
assets at its direct disposal is exceeded. The episodes
of recent years have shown that, one way or another,
international emergency finance has played an appre-
ciable role in efforts to moderate the effects of
shocks on various economies. Both for this reason
and because of the interdependencies which exist be-
tween different economies, we will now analyse the
question of possible international arrangements to
deal with episodes of very strong turbulence.
3. The international transmission of impulses
There are various types of channels for the interna-
tional transmission of macroeconomic impulses. In
addition to the traditional mechanisms (through trade
operations and market conditions in the financial
centres), in recent times special attention has been
paid to the effects of common movements in the as-
set prices of different countries. These effects can
themselves be due to different causes, such as:
i) changes in the international economy which
are reflected in a similar manner in several countries;
ii) direct impacts of some economies on others
(through trade, for example), which are incorporated
into the perceptions on asset yields;
iii) perceived analogies in the configurations or
policies of countries, which cause certain agents to
interpret some events in one economy as being use-
ful for predicting the behaviour of others; this mech-
anism would appear to operate in a context of
learning about the fundamental variables, through in-
formation perceived as being capable of being ex-
tended to other cases which individuals extract
(rightly or wrongly, in retrospective) from the evolu-
tion of different economies;
iv) spillover effects, because the liquidity con-
straints of operators specializing in holding securities
of a group of countries would cause them, in the
event of falls in the prices of some securities, to sell
off other assets19 (Calvo, 1998); this would have ef-
fects that could be amplified by cases of “herd
behaviour” on the part of other agents who base their
decisions on the observed actions of the first group,20
either because they think they reflect useful informa-
tion (Banerjee, 1992) or because they are applying
“follow the market” strategies due to principal-agent
problems21 (Krugman, 1998);
v) possible “self-fulfilling prophecy” phenom-
ena sparked off by certain events which act as focal
points for the coordination of expectations.
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19 It should be noted that this argument calls for some particular
hypotheses in order to rationalize strong contagion effects: one
of these hypotheses is that such specialists (who would have
more information than that possessed by the average operators
in the market about conditions in the respective economies)
have a portfolio that contains debt of different countries at the
same time. A proposition resulting from this argument (al-
though there is no clear evidence that this has been observed in
practice in recent episodes) is that specialists who have few
holdings of securities of the country which set off the downward
movement in prices, or who do not suffer from liquidity con-
straints, should simultaneously increase their demand for debt
of the other countries and thus moderate the severity of the con-
tagion.
20 It is worth recalling that information cascades –in which
agents imitate the actions of the others instead of relying on di-
rect first-hand information– are more likely when the informa-
tion the agents possess themselves is considered unreliable. The
appearance of such effects would thus seem to indicate a
pre-existing state of uncertainty.
21 This refers to the fact that portfolio managers may be evalu-
ated by their clients by comparison with the evolution of the
market average, thus making them reluctant to take positions
that are much different from “general opinion”.
There are some indications that in critical epi-
sodes there is increased correlation between the de-
mand for assets of different countries.22 However, it
is hard to distinguish the effects of the different
mechanisms that could have operated in each case,
and still harder to determine the importance of such
mechanisms in possible future cases. Furthermore,
although certain indicators of fragility may be useful,
it is not clear what specific conditions make an econ-
omy more vulnerable to contagion. Thus, from a pro-
spective point of view, the question is posed in very
general terms: there are sometimes states of great un-
certainty in which the effects of the international
transmission of financial disturbances are heightened
and are added to the spread of impulses through trade.
It is well known that the existence of interna-
tional spillovers can give rise to demands for the co-
ordination of macroeconomic policies. At the same
time, crisis situations usually compromise as a whole
the macroeconomic instruments of countries and
therefore typically reduce the degree of freedom for
determining the “coordination supply” (Heymann
and Navajas, 1992). Recent experience is instructive
in this respect: in the countries directly affected by
disturbances there was no sign of significant activity
for the joint determination of macroeconomic mea-
sures. Instead, there were “emergency” mechanisms
for the provision of liquidity, defined by the central
countries and international loan agencies with the
aim of reducing the impacts on the various countries
and inhibiting the spread of the upsets to other coun-
tries. At all events, the criteria and procedures behind
these interventions continue to be the subject of
heated debate.
When analysing possible international-scale
macroeconomic action it is necessary to bear in mind
the great variety of actors involved: the residents of
the individual countries, in their roles as economic
agents and participants in domestic politics; the oper-
ators on the international financial markets; the au-
thorities who define policies in each country;
regional coalitions, whether of a lasting or temporary
nature, and the relevant international institutions. In
circumstances like these, in which multiple agents
with different interests, relative weights and possibly
different perceptions interact with each other, the
“game” that gives rise to decisions is by no means
simple. Nevertheless, there are some basic features
which are obvious even at a cursory glance.
A first point which is obvious but nevertheless
worthy of note is that the behaviour of the central
economies has strong external repercussions: the
evolution of the economic cycle, of exchange parities
and of credit conditions in those economies acutely
influences the opportunities of other regions. The
policies of the central economies are naturally de-
cided as a function of domestic considerations; there
is little coordination among them, and the impacts on
third countries, if taken into account at all, are only
considered in critical situations, when widespread,
large-scale upsets are observed that could affect
them. Obviously, differences of size give rise to dif-
ferences in behaviour, and these are a fundamental
given element of the problem. However, it seems im-
portant to acknowledge the international effects of
policies and to establish arrangements whereby at
least the countries or regions that receive the impact
of impulses can participate by transmitting and re-
ceiving information on the future prospects of the
economies and policy lines. Arrangements for inter-
action are by no means an insignificant element in
decision-making, even though they may not take the
form of explicit commitments. They are also impor-
tant in so far as it is sought to prevent interna-
tional-scale disturbances and to establish guidelines
on action to deal with them if they do occur, because
although big macroeconomic swings occur in an oc-
casional manner it would be desirable to follow up
the evolution of the international economy more or
less continuously, with the participation of pol-
icy-makers (ECLAC, 1998b; Ocampo, 1999).
The set of emergency financing measures ap-
plied in recent episodes implicitly recognize the fact
that, in certain circumstances, the possibility of han-
dling crises goes beyond the national level. These
episodes have given rise to a debate on the desirabil-
ity of establishing some more formal mechanism for
acting as an international lender of last resort. De-
fining systems of this type is undoubtedly a difficult
matter. There are, of course, moral hazard problems,
both for the lenders and the recipients of the funds.
However, the cost of the crises for the debtor coun-
tries has generally been high (even when they have
received emergency credits to bolster up their liquid-
ity), so that it is hard to see what incentives there
could be for them to engage in policies which volun-
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22 See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996).
tarily increase the likelihood of an adverse shock.
Moreover, since it is generally considered very im-
portant to maintain easy access to international mar-
kets, possible opportunistic forms of behaviour
would probably be limited by considerations of repu-
tation. At the same time, the discretionality inherent
in the function of lender of last resort could become
a source of conflicts if this function were carried out
by an international agency; something similar would
apply in the case of the functions of supervision of
financial systems associated with that role.
These arguments (quite apart from the uncer-
tainty about the size of the funds that might be
needed in different circumstances and the difficulties
involved in making advance commitments to con-
tribute resources, if the latter were very large) would
suggest that credit aid to economies facing crises
should be maintained as a possibility to be decided
when the case arises. Such occasional schemes also
present problems, however, especially as regards the
timeliness of the measures (which would tend to be
taken only when the crisis was clearly acute), the cri-
teria on the availability and use of the resources, and
the definition of the conditions applicable to such
aid. Here, once again, there are dilemmas and
trade-offs. It would seem possible to devise mecha-
nisms defining the basic criteria (such as those on
fiscal performance and the supervision arrangements
applied by countries to their financial systems) re-
garding the requirements that an economy must ful-
fill in order to have access to contingency finance in
the event of disturbances in credit facilities (see for
example Agosin, 1999). Such criteria would neces-
sarily be rather arbitrary when the time came to ap-
ply them, and their announcement could amplify the
fluctuations in some cases, but they would neverthe-
less provide an element of predictability and would
possibly facilitate the operation of counter-cyclical
policies, especially to deal with signs of contrac-
tion.23
The regulation of credit markets has an interna-
tional aspect: the financial fragility of some econo-
mies has repercussions on others, and the rules laid
down by the central countries undoubtedly affect the
conditions of access to resources for the rest of the
world. This justifies the attempts to define interna-
tional standards (not necessarily identical for coun-
tries with different characteristics, or fixed over
time). At the same time, although it is natural that
there should be concern over the volatility of the
supply of credit for the emerging countries and its ef-
fects in terms of amplifying and spreading fluctua-
tions, there might be a danger that, if there were
strict regulations in the central countries, these could
operate as a sort of tax on the export of resources
which might affect the amount and cost of credit for
countries requiring finance.
In some groups of countries, a substantial part of
their trade in goods is with neighbouring countries in
their region but financial transactions are mainly
with the centres. This is so in the case of Mercosur
(although the geographical concentration of trade
varies between the countries). In such conditions, it
seems useful to analyse possible policy coordination
exercises, not in a “self-contained” context (where
only the regional participants are actors) but bearing
in mind the effect that the behaviour of each econ-
omy has on the interaction (especially in financial
matters) of the others with the rest of the world. In
order for a number of countries to agree to engage in
the coordinated management of their macroeconomic
instruments, the perceived incentives must be very
strong. There must therefore not only be close eco-
nomic interdependence but also previous experience
in forms of coordination which do not restrict the de-
cisions of the parties too much: at all events, con-
certed policy definition is always a gradual process.
The macroeconomic spillover is also more intense
if there is a regional component in the supply of fi-
nance to each economy, however. Quite apart from
the usefulness of mechanisms for consultation and
the exchange of information, it may also be benefi-
cial to define some regional guidelines of a macro-
economic nature (whether or not in the form of
explicit commitments) aimed at reducing uncer-
tainty about the mutual impacts between the econ-
omies.
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23 What would be desirable (although undoubtedly hard to do in
practice) would be to help to identify impacts of a transitory na-
ture and cases where the upsets are not due to previous depar-
tures from “good” policies, so that prudence in times of
expansion would be rewarded by greater capacity to keep up the
level of activity in crises. In this respect, credit risk ratings have




Decisions on saving, investment and asset holdings
depend on expectations which vary with changes in
perceptions and forms of analysis. These changes
sometimes cause major shifts in the perceived oppor-
tunities of the agents, especially when doubts set in
about the creditworthiness of debtors. It is difficult to
define the likelihood of major disturbances accu-
rately; the mechanisms behind the spread of im-
pulses in these cases also seem complex. It would be
dangerous, however, to ignore the potential volatility
of the supply and demand of credit, especially when
one bears in mind that economies are constantly
evolving, so that the patterns of behaviour observed
in the past are of only limited validity for judging
how agents make their forecasts.
A basic responsibility of economic policy is not
to become a factor of instability itself; at the same
time, it should act to forestall and moderate serious
macroeconomic fluctuations. In order to do this, the
public sector must keep itself financially sound and
use its leeway for action to cope with critical situa-
tions. Even so, it is likely that in certain circum-
stances the magnitude of impacts and their
transmission from one economy to another will make
it essential to take measures that go beyond the na-
tional level. Linking up policies to forestall and deal
with crises at the national, regional and international
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